Trident: The Harsh Reality Beyond the Bright Lights in the Skies

If you live on the west coast of North America, stretching from Northern California to Mexico, you might have seen a wild light show on November 7th and November 9th. If you did, have no fear and definitely do not listen to any conspiracy theorists; there were no aliens involved. It was just two separate test launches of the Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic missile.

But really; these are significant events! The US Navy launched the two test flights from the OHIO-Class "Trident" ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) USS Kentucky, which was submerged off of Point Mugu, Southern California. The missile traveled from its launch site to the US Ballistic Missile Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands where it very likely plashed down in the precise location intended; it has been said that the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles carried on the D5 missile can hit a target the size of a baseball diamond with extraordinary accuracy.

One of the two Trident missile test launches earlier this month (photo: US Navy)

The Kentucky finished its mid-life overhaul and nuclear refueling in April 2015, and as part of its subsequent shakedown before being pressed back into service its crew conducted the test launches to ensure the proper functioning of its missile launch systems as well as the reliability of the Trident missile itself. The Kentucky is based at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, the Navy's West Coast home port for eight of the nation's fourteen Trident submarines.

Just one of these Trident submarines, each carrying up to 24 missiles, each missile currently carrying an estimated four warheads on independently targetable reentry vehicles, is capable of incinerating an entire large continent.

A mammoth Trident ballistic missile submarine on patrol

These two test launches marked the 156th and 157th successful test launches since the missile's initial deployment in 1990. The missiles are manufactured by Lockheed Martin Space Systems in Sunnyvale, California.

It is clear that, as Popular Mechanics stated it, the US is definitely "flexing its nuclear muscles" in a clear message to Russia that we've still got the nukes, and we're ready to use them. And Trident is king when it comes to US nukes; currently accounting for roughly 70% of deployed nuclear weapons in the US arsenal.

The Navy most likely timed the two Trident test launches with the intention of creating a public spectacle in order to ensure maximum visibility to other nations, particularly Russia. Ironically, the Russians have been keeping tabs on Trident (and other US nuclear weapon systems for some time since the fall of the Berlin Wall).

Had the US decreased reliance on Trident, a relic of the Cold War standoff between the US and then Soviet Union, following the end of the Cold War, things might now look much different on the global nuclear front. China has been building up a ballistic missile submarine fleet and the associated weapons. And of course, Russia has started building new SSBNs and is upgrading older SSBNs, and is developing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (the Bulava).

A new Cold War is rapidly growing and heating up. Both the US and Russia have been throwing salvos of nuclear rhetoric at each other, and at this rate it might not be long before it starts looking much like it did back in the day when the two superpowers were locked in the deadly game of Mutually Assured Destruction. Dark days indeed!

The irony of all this is that we were handed an extraordinary "peace dividend" with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Had the US ramped back its nuclear weapons deployments back then, taking both land-based missiles and the Trident submarines off alert status, it would have sent a clear message that there was no need to threaten each other with extinction anymore.

Yet, in the case of Trident, the US had invested in a new missile, the Trident II D5, which was first deployed in 1990, just prior to the end of the Cold War. Neither the Navy nor Lockheed Martin were keen to mothball the new missiles or the crown jewel of the nation's nuclear triad (the Trident submarine). So Trident quietly continued to deploy, running silent and deep, essentially unnoticed here at home (although not by the Russians nor other nations).

And now the US Navy is hard at work, along with its partners in the shipbuilding sector, to develop a successor to the OHIO-Class (New Trident), scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and begin entering service in 2031.

The principal rationale given for the new submarines is the need to maintain the nation's "strategic nuclear deterrent." The principal irony of all this is that nuclear deterrence has failed a number of times (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis), and it has only been by the miracle of human intervention that the world was saved from what would have certainly been the end of civilization (as we know it).

While "experts" have argued for the strategic deterrence doctrine during the strange days of the Cold War, we now live in an even stranger new world in which we have very unstable non-state actors (that might acquire a nuclear weapon) as well as states that quite possibly do not stand the test of "stability" required for deterrence to work.

Add to that the fact the probability that  leaders of stable nation states might act irrationally under times of great duress, and the argument for deterrence crumbles. Deterrence must be 100% infallible in order to be relied upon, and that is absolutely impossible in the real world. One failure could literally bring about the deaths of billions of people.

Trident was designed at the height of the Cold War, with at least one specific purpose - to present a guaranteed second strike capability (the ability to respond to a nuclear attack) to hold the Soviet Union at bay. The design of the Trident missile also presented an unstated purpose - to present a first strike (preemptive surprise attack) capability as well. Trident was only designed to hold the Soviet Union hostage to the inevitability of Mutually Assured Destruction, in which both nations would have waged full-scale nuclear war, obliterating each other's nations, murdering each other's populations, and resulting in "nuclear darkness," which would have resulted in the subsequent deaths by starvation of much of the rest of the world's population.

US Defense Secretary Ash Carter has recently been fanning the flames by accusing "Russia of endangering world order, citing its incursions in Ukraine and loose talk about nuclear weapons." In the article in The Economic Times Carter was also quoted as saying that, "Most disturbing, Moscow's nuclear saber-rattling raises questions about Russian leaders' commitment to strategic stability, their respect for norms against the use of nuclear weapons, and whether they respect the profound caution nuclear-age leaders showed with regard to the brandishing of nuclear weapons." Carter also referred to China in his remarks, but saved the strong stuff for Russia.

Ash Carter; Lecturing the world, while missing the "plank in our own eye."

The Economic Times nailed it with this statement: "The backdrop to Carter's remarks is the reality that after more than two decades of dominating great-power relations, the United States is seeing Russia reassert itself and China expand its military influence beyond its own shores." Therein lies the rub; The Cold War never really ended for the US. We have, ever since the fall of the Wall, had only one purpose - to maintain global hegemony through our military power.

I guess the lessons of parenthood have been lost on our nation's "leaders" (and the Military-Industrial Complex that controls them) - we can have influence on others, yet we cannot control them (in the long run at least). And yet we continue to try to exert control through our military, and nuclear weapons are the ultimate form of control by the threat of their use. It is coming back to haunt us.

The quest for nuclear weapons, and particularly Trident, has been (as one of my colleagues has called it) a Faustian bargain. Indeed, it is a deal with the Devil, and one where we cannot come out ahead. Scrapping Trident must be at the forefront of any efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, and reducing deployments and taking its weapons off alert status would be a major first step in showing good faith (while not unilaterally giving up anything of substance).

Will we, before it is too late, see the folly of our ways, realizing that it is futile to continue trying to maintain an empire the likes of which even the British never could have imagined? Will we come to see the futility of holding on to the fantasy of nuclear deterrence? Will we come to grips with the fact that nuclear weapons offer no security, and will most certainly (as any expert in probability and statistics will gladly explain) lead to either accidental or intentional nuclear war, with horrific consequences to humankind?

If only President Obama would find the convictions he left behind in Prague and sit down with President Putin to begin the necessary dialogue to begin the process of ramping back tensions between our two nations and begin the most important process of leading the world toward disarmament. Would that not be the legacy for which future generations would honor him?

Royal Navy submariner says Trident is a nuclear “disaster waiting to happen”

NEWS RELEASE

June 1, 2015

For Immediate Release


The risk of accidental detonation of Trident nuclear missiles surfaced in recent allegations by a British submariner.

William McNeilly, an Engineering Technician Weapons Engineer Submariner for the UK's Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System disclosed this and other allegations in a document released early last month (see McNeilly's statement at Wikileaks: https://wikileaks.org/trident-safety/)

The most serious of McNeilly's allegations is the risk of a catastrophic failure of the system's nuclear-armed missiles, the Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, deployed on both UK and US ballistic missile (Trident) submarines.

A Royal Navy instruction manual, referenced by McNeilly, states that the “chief potential hazard” from a live D-5 missile is “accidental ignition” of the first, second or third stage rocket motor propellant.

The thermonuclear warheads on the D-5 missile “clustered around the third stage rocket motor are at risk from a rocket motor propellant fire.” The intense heat of a rocket propellant fire would likely cause the warheads' conventional high explosives to “cook to (non-nuclear) detonation, releasing radioactive materials and aerosols over a wide area,” according to the manual.

Such an event occurring at sea would likely cause the pressure hull to rupture resulting in the catastrophic loss of the submarine and crew. The same event occurring while the submarine is in port would likely release plutonium and other radioactive substances over surrounding areas, putting base personnel and the public at substantial risk.

Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, Silverdale, Washington, where 8 of the US Navy's 14 Trident submarines are home-ported, is just 20 miles West of Seattle, and many other cities are even closer to the base. The other 6 Tridents are based at Kings Bay, Georgia.

A radiation release from Bangor would cause an increased cancer risk to people living in surrounding areas, while any attempt at cleanup would be highly problematic and run into the billions of dollars.

The risk of a Trident missile third stage rocket fire was raised in a report to Congress on nuclear weapons safety by physicist Sidney Drell in 1990. More recently, it has been highlighted by journalist Eric Schlosser, the author of a book, “Command and Control”, exposing nuclear weapons safety issues.

Schlosser spoke specifically to this same concern with the sensitive rocket propellant, saying that it is “relatively easy” to ignite. “A fire or explosion involving the third stage could cause the dispersal of plutonium - and perhaps a nuclear detonation with a small yield."

Schlosser added: "These extracts from the Royal Navy safety manual on Trident, if they are authentic, seem to confirm the danger. To my knowledge, there has never been a serious accident with a Trident missile. But improper handling, a fire, or a terrorist act could be catastrophic."

In a 2003 missile handling accident at Bangor, a ladder, accidentally left in a submarine's missile tube while the missile was being winched out, came within inches of a warhead before operators discovered the error and stopped the winching process.

Glen Milner, who won a decision in the US Supreme Court in 2011 regarding the public's right to know the dangers posed by the Navy’s Indian Island munitions facility near Port Townsend, Washington, said, “If there was a accident involving missile propellant at Bangor, it would be a disaster affecting much of the Puget Sound region, and the repercussions would be felt far beyond.”

Milner has voiced concern about the risks inherent to the D-5 missile, particularly in light of the Navy's construction of a Second Explosives Handling Wharf at Bangor. Because of the proximity of the two wharves, if two Trident submarines were being serviced simultaneously and an accidental ignition occurred on one, there is a substantial risk of the second submarine's missiles being put at risk of propellant detonation.

Captain Tom Rogers, USN Ret., a former submarine commander, explained that the Navy chose the more volatile rocket propellant in order to fit the large payload (up to eight warheads) in the available space and to ensure the missile's range requirement. Rogers calls this "Trident's dirty little secret."

Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action believes the information shared by McNeilly is in the interest of public safety, and calls on the British government to immediately release him from prison and appoint an independent board of inquiry into his allegations.

Whereas independent scientific experts in the US have previously rendered their opinion regarding the risks inherent in the Trident II D-5 missile, Ground Zero calls urges the US Congress to immediately review the earlier recommendations and conduct an inquiry into why the Navy purchased and deployed an inherently unsafe missile system.

Leonard Eiger, spokesperson for Ground Zero's NO To NEW TRIDENT Campaign, asks why, besides the serious safety concerns, the US government has continued to conduct Trident patrols at near Cold War levels in the decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall. “Trident is a Cold War relic, and the government continues to justify its existence based on an obsolete doctrine of strategic deterrence. What security is provided by a weapon system designed to hold the (then) Soviet Union under the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction? Continued deployment of Trident and progress towards a replacement fleet of ballistic missile submarines only serves to drive a new Cold War nuclear submarine arms race. It is time to scrap Trident.”

Additional References:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY: THE CASE OF TRIDENT, in Science and Global Security, 1994

TRIDENT MISSILES NEED SAFER DESIGN, STUDY SAYS 

TRIDENT WARHEAD HAZARDS: CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES, Pacific Life Research Center, Compiled by Bob Aldridge

Report to Congress: Assessment of the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements, R.E. Kidder, 1991

Contact: Leonard Eiger, Media and Outreach
Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action
www.gzcenter.org
http://www.notnt.org
subversivepeacemaking@gmail.com
(425)445-2190

Trident missile propellant a disaster in waiting

Editor's Note: Glen Milner of Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action has previously written about the danger inherent in the sensitive rocket fuel used in the Navy's Trident II D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile (a "design flaw"). Now British whistleblower William McNeilly has leaked a top-secret manual in which the British Navy addresses the potential "accidental ignition" of the Trident rocket fuel and the disastrous consequences.

If submerged... goodbye submarine and crew. If an accident occurred in port, plutonium and other radioactive substances would likely contaminate surrounding areas putting the public at great risk.

On November 7, 2003 a missile handling crew preparing to unload a Trident missile from the USS Georgia accidentally left an access ladder in the missile tube when a crewmember switched on the crane, which began hoisting the missile out of the tube. The missile contacted the ladder, which punctured the nose fairing, coming within inches of the warheads and third stage rocket motor before someone noticed the error and stopped the hoist. I'll let you imagine the potential consequences had someone not stopped the hoist!!!

An insider's view of the Bangor Second Explosives Handling Wharf
where Trident missiles are loaded and off-loaded.

Finally, I have uploaded the full statement by whistleblower William McNeilly; click here to read it.

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Trident missile flaw could cause explosions and radioactive contamination, reveals whistleblower

By Rob Edwards, Originally published in HeraldScotland.com on Sunday, May 24, 2015


An INHERENT flaw in Trident missiles could lead to fires, explosions and widespread radioactive contamination, according to a top-secret safety manual leaked by the naval whistleblower, William McNeilly.

The Royal Navy's official instructions on how to take care of nuclear weapons reveal that the "chief potential hazard" from a live missile is the "accidental ignition" of solid rocket fuel.

This could cause the warheads' conventional high explosives to detonate and scatter plutonium and other toxic materials "over a wide area", it says.

The Trident D5 missile, used by both the UK and US, is designed with nuclear warheads closely wrapped around the third stage rocket motor. This has been highlighted as a design flaw by US experts in the past, but has not previously been acknowledged by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

The results of a rocket fuel fire at sea or on land could be "catastrophic" for submariners and the public, critics warned last night. The MoD, however, said it had to train for every scenario "no matter how extreme and unlikely".

McNeilly, as well as alleging 30 Trident security and safety concerns in an 18-page dossier revealed by the Sunday Herald last weekend, says he filmed the weapons safety manual on his smartphone. Code-named CB8890, it is a book kept in a safe in the submarine missile control centre, he says.

Extracts quoted by McNeilly disclose that the warheads "clustered around the third stage rocket motor are at risk from a rocket motor propellant fire". Exposed to heat, the warheads' conventional high explosives "could cook to (non-nuclear) detonation, releasing radioactive materials and aerosols over a wide area," the manual says.

If warhead containment is breached, "several radioactive and/or toxic materials may be exposed to the atmosphere," it says. "These include plutonium, uranium, lithium compounds, tritium gas and beryllium. If mixed with water, fumes or toxic gases will be generated."

The navy manual paints a dramatic picture of what could happen. "The chief potential hazard associated with a live missile is the accidental ignition of the first, second or third stage rocket motor propellant," it says.

"If this were to happen in the missile tube with the muzzle hatch shut and locked, the pressure hull and bulkheads of the missile compartment would burst within a matter of seconds," it continues.

"The missile contains a number of subsidiary propulsive and ordnance items that could cause damage to the missile and/or release toxic gases into the missile compartment if initiated prematurely. In some cases, this could also result in ignition or detonation of one of the rocket motors."

The manual also warns that warheads could be ruptured by an accident and cause "radioactive contamination." Serious damage "could also result from a successful terrorist attack", it says.

The risk of a third stage rocket fire was raised in a report on nuclear weapons safety by the eminent physicist, Sidney Drell, for a US congressional committee in 1990. More recently, it has been highlighted by Eric Schlosser, the US author of a book, Command and Control, exposing safety problems with nuclear weapons.

He pointed out that Trident's solid rocket fuel was a high-energy propellant that was "relatively easy" to ignite. "The conventional explosives used in the American and British warheads designed for Trident are vulnerable to fire," he said.

"The third stage of the missile - where the warheads surround the rocket motor, instead of sitting on top of it - combines both risks. A fire or explosion involving the third stage could cause the dispersal of plutonium - and perhaps a nuclear detonation with a small yield."

Schlosser added: "These extracts from the Royal Navy safety manual on Trident, if they are authentic, seem to confirm the danger. To my knowledge, there has never been a serious accident with a Trident missile. But improper handling, a fire, or a terrorist act could be catastrophic."

Peter Burt from the Nuclear Information Service, which is critical of nuclear weapons, pointed out that Trident was designed 40 years ago to deliver a huge destructive force to the maximum range possible. Mounting the warheads next to a rocket motor was "a short cut which has created an inherent design flaw and drastically increased the risks from an accident involving the missile," he said.

The MoD stressed that the Royal Navy had safely operated the nuclear deterrent for over 40 years without a nuclear weapons accident. "This is a safety record it is vital to maintain, which is precisely why we prepare and train for every scenario no matter how extreme and unlikely," said a spokesman.

But the SNP's new defence spokesman in Westminster and MP for Argyll and Bute, Brendan O'Hara, thought that the new revelations would shock the public. "It makes for very chilling reading and reinforces just how dangerous these weapons are," he said.

"It starkly lays out what could potentially happen in various scenarios all of which would be catastrophic for the crew and potentially the public, with the release of radiation."

Original article URL:  http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/trident-missile-flaw-could-cause-fires-explosions-and-radioactive-contamination-revea.1432463191

First come the new subs... next will be new missiles!

The Trident (OHIO Class) Replacement Program is going full steam ahead. The following article makes that quite clear. The most intriguing statement made is that "OR subs will initially carry the Trident II D5LE missile." The keyword here is "initially." The Trident II D-5 was first deployed in 1990. Lockheed Martin is still building the Trident missile in Sunnyvale, California, and the Navy recently completed the 154th and 155th successful,consecutive test launches. The Trident II D-5s are currently being upgraded to give them 25 more years of service life. With the new subs planned to be deployed into the 2080s it is highly probable that the Navy will be pursuing a replacement missile well before the end of the missiles' extended service life. And that will be a big ticket item that no one is currently discussing.

The ultimate question (and really the elephant in the room) is - Why we are building a new generation of ballistic missile submarine that is planned to be deployed almost to the end of the century when it only serves to foster a rapidly developing nuclear submarine arms race? Is there no end in sight? Or would it be more appropriate to say that the end will be in sight should the U.S. (and other nuclear nations) continue down the road of nuclear modernization??? Will this enter the conversation at the upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference? Let's hope so.

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GAO Notes U.S. Navy’s Ohio-class Replacement Milestones 

Mar 19, 2015 Michael Fabey Aerospace Daily & Defense Report

With concrete accomplishments in the previous year, the U.S. Navy’s Ohio-class submarine replacement (OR) program looks to be in good shape, according to the recent annual report of Pentagon program reviews by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).

“In 2014, the contractor and the Navy completed ship specifications and set the ship’s length, both major milestones, as it commits to the space available for ship systems,” GAO says.

Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, has made it clear repeatedly that the OR is the Navy’s number-one priority acquisition program.

GAO estimates it will cost about $95.8 billion to buy 12 submarines, which breaks down into $11.8 billion for research and development and about $84 billion for procurement.

The new boats will replace the current fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as they begin to be retired in 2027, GAO notes.

“The Navy began technology development in January 2011 in order to avoid a gap in sea-based nuclear deterrence between the Ohio-class’s retirement and the production of a replacement,” GAO says.

The Navy is working with the U.K. to develop a common missile compartment for use on OR and the U.K.’s replacement SSBN, GAO says, and the OR subs will initially carry the Trident II D5LE missile.

“The Navy is continuing to develop and evaluate new technologies to incorporate into OR, including an X-stern configuration; a new propulsor; and an extended-life drive shaft that, according to program officials, will increase the platform’s availability,” GAO reports.

“According to program officials, the Navy continues to prototype and test the X-stern and propulsor technologies on a scale model to minimize risk.”

The Navy plans to complete 83% of the design disclosures – the detailed plans used on the shop floor – prior to the start of construction, GAO says. Last October, the program awarded a contract for production of 17 missile tubes, one of the boat’s critical subsystems.

“According to program officials, these tubes will support the quad pack prototype, testing, and also the United Kingdom’s replacement SSBN,” the report said.

To help cut costs, GAO says, “Officials stated that they are continuing to investigate cost-saving options including maximizing equipment reuse from Virginia- and Ohio-class submarines and also leveraging manufacturing techniques, such as robotic welding and modular construction. According to program officials, the Navy is also investigating alternate contracting strategies such as a joint-class block buy with Virginia-class submarines or multi-year contracting, which may provide for additional savings by allowing for volume discounts in material purchases.”

Multi-year contracting, GAO emphasizes, is allowed by statute if, among other things, the design is stable, technical risk is not excessive, and the cost estimates are realistic. “It is typically not used with lead ship construction because of the unknowns inherent in Navy lead ship construction,” the report says.

Source URL: http://aviationweek.com/awin-only/gao-notes-us-navy-s-ohio-class-replacement-milestones

New Trident Creating New Submarine Arms Race: Opinion by Lawrence Wittner

Opinion: New nuclear submarine arms race poses great danger

The USS Louisiana arrives at its homeport, the Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Ga., on Friday, Aug. 29, 1997. (AP Photo/U.S. Navy, John Hill)

Reprinted from The Times of Trenton guest opinion column originally published on August 12, 2014 at 6:04 AM

By Lawrence S. Wittner

Ever since the horrors of submarine warfare became a key issue during World War I, submarines have had a sinister reputation. And the building of new, immensely costly, nuclear-armed submarines by the U.S. government and others may soon raise the level of earlier anxiety to a nuclear nightmare.

This spring, the U.S. government continued its steady escalation of research and development funding for the replacement of its current nuclear submarine fleet through one of the most expensive shipbuilding undertakings in American history — starting in 2031, the phasing in of 12 new SSBN(X) submarines. Each of these nuclear-powered vessels, the largest submarines the Navy has ever built, will carry up to 16 Trident ballistic missiles fitted with multiple nuclear warheads. All in all, this new submarine fleet is expected to deploy about 1,000 nuclear warheads — 70 percent of the U.S. government’s strategic nuclear weapons.

From the standpoint of the U.S. military, nuclear-armed submarines are very attractive. Capable of being placed in hidden locations around the world and remaining submerged for months at a time, they are less vulnerable to attack than are ground-launched or air-launched nuclear weapons, the other two legs of the “nuclear triad.” Moreover, they can wreak massive death and destruction upon “enemy” nations quite rapidly.

From the standpoint of civilians, the new Trident submarine fleet is somewhat less appealing. Strategic nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons in world history, and the use of only one of them over a large city could annihilate millions of people instantly. If the thousands of such weapons available to the U.S. government and other governments were employed in war, they would incinerate most of the planet. Thereafter, radioactivity, disease, nuclear winter and starvation would end most remaining life on Earth.

Of course, even in an accident, such weapons could do incredible damage. And, over the years, nuclear-armed submarines have been in numerous accidents. In February 2009, a British and a French submarine, both nuclear-powered and armed with nuclear missiles, collided under water in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Although the two vessels were fitted with state-of-the-art detection equipment, neither spotted the other until it was too late to avert the collision. Fortunately, they were moving very slowly at the time, and the damage was limited (though enormously expensive to repair). But a sharper collision could have released vast quantities of radioactive fuel and flung their deadly nuclear warheads across the ocean floor.

In addition, when the dangers are so immense, it is worth keeping in mind that people, like the high-tech nuclear submarines, are not always infallible or reliable. Submarine crews — living in cramped quarters, bored and isolated for months at a time — could well be as plagued by the poor morale, dishonesty, drug use and incompetence found among their counterparts at land-based nuclear missile facilities.

Taxpayers, particularly, might be concerned about the unprecedented expense of this new submarine fleet. According to most estimates, building the 12 SSBN(X) submarines will cost about $100 billion. And there will be additional expenditures for the missiles, nuclear warheads and yearly maintenance, bringing the total tab to what the Pentagon estimated, three years ago, at $347 billion.

People might be forgiven for feeling some bewilderment at this immense U.S. government investment in a new nuclear weapons system. After all, back in April 2009, amid much fanfare, President Barack Obama proclaimed “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” This was followed by a similar commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world made by the members of the U.N. Security Council, including five nuclear-armed nations, among them the United States. But, as this nuclear weapons buildup indicates, such commitments seem to have been tossed down the memory hole.

In arguing for the new Trident submarine fleet, U.S. military leaders have pointed to the fact that other nations are maintaining or building nuclear-armed submarines. And they are correct about that. France and Britain are maintaining their current fleets, although Britain is on the verge of beginning the construction of a new one with U.S. assistance; Israel reportedly possesses one; China is apparently ready to launch one in 2014; India is set to launch its own in 2015; and Pakistan might be working to develop one. Meanwhile, Russia is modernizing its own submarine ballistic missile fleet.

In this context, there is an obvious alternative to the current race to deploy the world’s deadliest weapons in the ocean depths. The nuclear powers could halt their building of nuclear-armed submarines and eliminate their present nuclear-armed submarine fleets. This action would not only honor their professed commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world, but would save their nations from making enormous expenditures and from the possibility of experiencing a catastrophe of unparalleled magnitude.

Why not act now, before this arms race to disaster goes any further?

Lawrence Wittner, syndicated by PeaceVoice, is professor of history emeritus at SUNY/Albany.

Follow The Times of Trenton on Twitter @TimesofTrenton. Find The Times of Trenton on Facebook.

© 2014 NJ.com. All rights reserved.

Editor's Note: Wittner's Op-Ed is reprinted here without anyone's permission, although with credit given to the Times of Trenton, NJ.Com for helping bring about a public conversation about nuclear weapons!

Source URL for original article:  http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/08/opinion_new_us_trident_submarine_fleet_is_unnecessary_dangerous_expense.html

Summary of the Important Facts on New Trident

If you are looking for a brief, easy-to-read overview of the Navy's Trident replacement program, you've come to the right place. Gabrielle Tarini, an intern at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation has done an excellent job of summarizing the salient facts surrounding the Ohio-Class Replacement Program, aka: SSBN(X). I've reprinted it here complete with all of her reference links.

The SSBN(X) is part of the Pentagon's nuclear modernization plan, which, as Tarini reminds us, has been called a '"modernization mountain"' according to "one former Pentagon official." It is most definitely a mountain of Everest proportion as well as risk, and it's definitely a long fall.

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Fact Sheet: The Ohio-Class 

Replacement Ballistic Submarine Program

by Gabrielle Tarini, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

June 16, 2014

Background

The Ohio-Class Replacement program, also known as the SSBN(X), is a program to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines to replace the U.S. Navy’s current force of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines.

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) form “the most survivable leg” of the U.S. nuclear triad, and are armed with Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The first of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs will reach the end of its 42-year service life in 2027. The remaining 13 boats will reach the end of their service lives at a rate of about one ship per year thereafter.

Only 12 rather than 14 SSBN(X)s will be needed to fulfill the Navy’s current strategic nuclear deterrent requirement of 10 operational (i.e. not undergoing maintenance activities) boats at sea at any given time because the SSBN(X) will be built with a life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor core. Thus, only 2 SSBN(X)s will be unavailable for service at any given moment.

The first Ohio-class replacement boat was scheduled to be procured in FY2019, but the Navy’s FY2013 budget deferred its procurement by two years to FY2021, largely due to fiscal constraints in the wake of the passage of the 2011 Budget Control Act. As a result of the deferment, the Navy will be left with only 10 total boats during the 2030s.

Financial Costs

The Navy’s FY2014 30-year shipbuilding plan estimated that the lead boat in the program will cost $12 billion. The cost of boats 2-12 was initially estimated by the Navy at $6 billion to $7 billion; however, the Department of Defense established that the target average cost per submarine should be $4.9 billion. The Navy has since undertaken cost cutting measures, but as of April 2014, it had only reduced the average unit cost to $5.36 billion. The Navy estimates the total 50-year lifecycle cost at $347 billion.

Some independent estimates of the cost to build the SSBN(X) are higher than the Navy’s estimate of approximately $77 billion (not including research and development). For example, an October 2013 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put the procurement cost at $87 billion and the total development cost (including research and development) at over $100 billion.

The Modernization Mountain

The SSBN(X) is part of a larger effort to rebuild the U.S. nuclear triad and its associated warheads over the next 25-30 years. The procurement of the SSBN(X) will overlap in the 2020s with the Pentagon’s plan to spend an estimated $81 billion on a new generation of long-range strike bombers, some or all of which will be nuclear capable, and additional tens of billions of dollars on a new nuclear cruise missile and a new ICBM or life extension of the existing Minuteman III ICBM.

This ambitious nuclear modernization plan will create what one former Pentagon official has called a “modernization mountain” in the budget in the mid part of the next decade.

Many current and former government and military officials believe that it will be unaffordable to rebuild all three legs of the nuclear triad at the same time.

Opportunity Costs

Even with the Navy’s current effort to reduce the estimated unit cost of the SSBN(X) toward the $4.9 billion DOD target figure, there is concern that the program could crowd out funding for other Navy shipbuilding programs in the 2020s and early 2030s.

According to Navy officials, if the Navy were to fund the Ohio-Class Replacement program from its current shipbuilding budget, it would consume a third to half of the money in the budget and force the Navy to forgo the acquisition of up to 32 naval vessels.

Vice Admiral William Burke, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, stated that if the Navy bought the 12 planned SSBN(X)s with its own funds, the resulting battle force would be unable meet the current requirements to field a 306-ship fleet.

Possible Solutions

There have been several solutions proposed to lower the cost of the Ohio-Class Replacement program and its impact on funding available for other Navy shipbuilding programs:

1. Use a single block buy contract to consolidate the Ohio-class replacement boats and Virginia-class boats when their production synchronizes during the mid-2020s:

• A block buy contract could offer savings that would not be realized using separate contracts for the two submarine programs. 
• If the Navy decides to propose such a contract it would develop a legislative proposal in 2017.

2. Lengthen the procurement schedule and procure one SSBN(X) every two years rather than the Navy’s planned rate of one year:

• This option would not reduce the program’s total cost, but rather could reduce the impact of the program on the amount of funding available for other ships in certain years.
• However, this option could result in a loss of learning at the ship yard in moving from the one SSBN(X) to the next and create additional costs.

3. Fund SSBN(X) outside the Navy’s shipbuilding budget:

• This option would preserve Navy shipbuilding funds for other Navy shipbuilding programs.
• There is precedent for such an arrangement—most spending for missile defense (which is viewed as national program spending) is not funded through the individual military services.
• Supporters of this option also argue that strategic nuclear deterrence is a national mission, and thus the burden of the cost of the program should not fall on the Navy.
• Critics of this option argue that a special fund discourages hard choices and is unrealistic because the Pentagon must still find extra money for the program. It could also prompt the Army and Air Force to lobby for special treatment for some of their big-ticket procurement programs as well.

4. Cut the planned number of SSBN(x)s:

• A 2011 report published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) suggested that the Navy reduce the number of SSBN(X)s in the fleet to 10, but increase the number of launch tubes on each submarine to 20; this could save the Navy $7 billion over the life of the fleet.
• A 2013 report by the Stimson Center also suggests cutting the planned buy of SSBN(X)s from 12 to 10, with 16 launch tubes on each submarine. This recommendation would save $1 billion in the near term and an additional $10 billion in the 2020s.
• A 2013 report by the CBO on options for reducing the federal budget deficit analyzed the option of reducing the SSBN(X) force to 8 boats. The savings under this option would total $15.7 billion from 2015-2023. During the 2030s, this option could save an additional $30 billion by avoiding the purchase of 4 more replacement submarines. An 8 boat force would still provide a robust deterrent, and the Navy could still deploy the maximum number of warheads at sea consistent with New START.
• The Navy initially planned to purchase 24 Ohio-class boats; however, in 1991 Congress directed the termination of the program with the 18th boat, citing anticipated force limits under START-1. Not long after, 4 boats were converted into a conventional only role, bringing the number of nuclear submarines down to 14.

Congressional Action

Congress appropriated $1.1 billion in FY2014 for the Ohio-Class Replacement program.

The FY2015 budget request of $1.29 billion for the program is $190 million above the FY2014 appropriation.

The House and Senate Armed Services committees included provisions in their respective version of the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act that would create a special National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund to cover the cost of the Ohio-class submarine replacement outside of the Navy budget. Lawmakers hope that the bill would eliminate the competition for funding between the SSBN(X) and other shipbuilding projects—at least directly. As noted above, critics of the fund contend that the money for the SSBN(X) would simply be paid out of someone else’s (i.e. the Army or Air Force’s) budget, and argue that giving the Navy a pass on tough budget choices by the creation of a special fund would not solve the problem.

Gabrielle Tarini is a Summer 2014 intern at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Link to original article: http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/fact_sheet_the_ohio-class_replacement_ballistic_submarine_program/

150 Trident Test Launches (And Counting) !$!$!$!$!$!$!$!$!$

Lockheed Martin proudly announced the 149th and 150th successful test flights of the Trident II D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile, test fired from an unnamed U.S. Navy OHIO Class ballistic missile submarine based in Kings Bay, Georgia.

The two Trident II D-5 missiles used in this test cost $70.5 million each (for a total of $141 million), plus all the costs of reconfiguring each missile for the test, and other costs, including securing the launch area and tracking. 

The Navy carries out these tests after a Trident sub has finished a major overhaul to ensure that the missiles will work flawlessly should the order to launch (armed missiles) be received by the Tridents out on patrol. With up to 8 (100 or 475 kiloton) thermonuclear warheads per missile (current estimate: 4 warheads), the death, devastation and radioactive fallout would be horrific. And, one can only wonder how many missiles would be launched.

These are the missiles that will be deployed on the next generation of ballistic missile submarines currently in the research and development phase and due to begin construction in 2019.

We can afford neither the economic impact nor the risks created by the production of 12 New Trident submarines. Such action is immoral, illegal under international humanitarian law, and in contravention of our obligations under Article VI of the The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which states that:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

So we say NO To NEW TRIDENT!!! We say YES to real efforts toward disarmament (and dramatic changes in foreign policy that will reduce our reliance on military force). 

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One of two Trident II D5 missiles tested June 2 by the U.S. Navy.
Photo: U.S. Navy

Trident II D5 Missile Reaches 150 Successful Test Flights

Navy Test-fires Submarine-launched Missiles Built by Lockheed Martin

SUNNYVALE, Calif., June 4, 2014 -- The U.S. Navy's Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile, built by Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT], has achieved 150 successful test flights, setting a new reliability record for large ballistic missiles. The Navy launched two unarmed missiles June 2 in the Atlantic Ocean from a submerged Ohio-class submarine, marking the 149(th) and 150(th) successful test flights of the missile since design completion in 1989.

The test flights were part of a demonstration and shakedown operation, which the Navy uses to certify a submarine for deployment following an overhaul. The missiles were converted into test configurations with kits containing range safety devices and flight telemetry instrumentation.

The operation included the first flight of two modernized avionics subsystems that control key missile functions during flight. The subsystems were updated under the D5 Life Extension program, which incorporates current technologies into the missile's electronics to cost-effectively prolong the service life of the reliable D5 missile design on current and next-generation submarine platforms.

"The success of this Life Extension flight is a tribute to the dedication and innovation of the entire government and industry team," said Doug White, Fleet Ballistic Missile programs vice president, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company. "In partnership with Navy Strategic Systems Programs, we set the bar high to provide a credible, reliable and affordable sea-based strategic deterrent for the nation."

First deployed in 1990, the D5 missile is currently aboard U.S. Navy Ohio-class and U.K. Royal Navy Vanguard-class submarines. The three-stage, solid-propellant, inertial-guided missile can travel a nominal range of 4,000 nautical miles and carries independently targeted reentry bodies.

Lockheed Martin has been the Navy's strategic missile prime contractor since 1955. The company also performs program management and engineering services for the Royal Navy under the Polaris Sales Agreement.

Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 113,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. The corporation's net sales for 2013 were $45.4 billion.

Contact:
Lynn Fisher
1-408-742-7606
Email: lynn.m.fisher@lmco.com

SOURCE Lockheed Martin
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2014/june/0604-ss-trident.html

Trident is "an accident waiting to happen"

Eric Schlosser, who will talk about his new book on nuclear weapons in Seattle on October 1st, published a provocative article in The Guardian just the other day.

Nuclear weapons: an accident waiting to happen focuses primarily on British nuclear weapons -  specifically the country's four Trident submarines and nuclear armed missiles they carry.  The following paragraph asks questions not only absent from the British public debate on Trident, but the public debate in the U.S. as well:

The public debate about Britain's Trident submarines and their missiles has focused mainly on the long-term costs and economic benefits of replacing them, the number of jobs that might be gained or lost, the necessity of round-the-clock patrols. Some fundamental questions have been largely absent from the discussion. How would this cold war missile, due to remain in service for another 30 years, actually be used in a 21st-century conflict? What targets would it destroy and in what circumstances? Whom is it supposed to kill? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, do the British people face a greater chance of being harmed by their own nuclear weapons, through an accident or a mistake, than by a surprise attack?

Ahhhh yes!!!  We must not forget the monumental risks imposed by Trident (on both sides of The Pond).  Schlosser discusses issues specific to Trident later on in the article:

The safety of the Trident D5 missile has long been a source of concern. In December 1990, the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety, a group of eminent physicists appointed by the US Congress, warned that its unusual design posed significant risks. To save space, the multiple warheads weren't mounted on top of the missile; they surrounded its third-stage rocket engine. And the "high-energy" class 1.1 propellant used in that rocket engine was far more likely than other propellants to explode in an accident. "The safety issue of concern here," the panel found, "is whether an accident during handling of an operational missile – viz, transporting and loading – might detonate the propellant which in turn could cause the HE [high explosives] in the warhead to detonate, leading to dispersal of plutonium, or even the initiation of a nuclear yield." 

The decision to use the more energetic rocket fuel and the more unstable high explosive was made during the early 1980s, to increase the range of the Trident D5 missile and decrease the weight of its warheads. The first British Trident submarine went on patrol four years after these safety risks were discovered, and the Trident D5 missile is supposed to remain in service until 2042. The risk of explosion and plutonium dispersal is greatest when the warheads are being loaded on to the sub, unloaded from the sub, or transported by road between Scotland and the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, Berkshire.

Glen Milner of Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action in Poulsbo, Washington has attempted to focus the public's attention on the risks of Trident for many years.  "Milner has extensively researched the rocket propellant used in the D5 and has spoken out publicly on its risks.  He was cited in a Crosscut.com article earlier this year about the Navy's plan to double its missile handling capacity at its Bangor Trident submarine base on Hood Canal in Washington State.

That same article cited a 1986 accident involving Trident rocket motors.  More recently at the Bangor submarine base (November 2003) "a ladder left inside a submarine's missile tube punctured a missile's nose cone and came within inches of a nuclear warhead." (source: Kitsap Sun newspaper)  A close call indeed.  The construction of a Second Explosives Handling Wharf near the existing wharf greatly increases the probability of a major disaster should there be an accidental detonation at one wharf if two submarines are being simultaneously loaded/unloaded.

The public (in both the UK and US) should be concerned, and indeed outraged, that any (token) public discussion is NOT engaging the truly important questions about why (in the US) we should spend nearly $100 billion - and some consider this a conservative estimate - just to build twelve new Trident submarines.

Beyond the very real risks of accidents, Trident is an archaic Cold War first-strike weapons system that just doesn't seem to want to go down without a fight.  Speaking of "fighting",  just (to use Schlosser's questions) How would this cold war missile, due to remain in service for another 30 years, actually be used in a 21st-century conflict? What targets would it destroy and in what circumstances? Whom is it supposed to kill? 

Questions, questions, questions... Any answers???

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Editor's Note: Eric Schlosser will talk about his most recent book, Command and Control Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, at the Seattle Public Library on Tuesday, October 1st at 7:00 PM.  There will be a meditation in preparation for the event at 6:25 PM just outside the library, sponsored by the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, Seattle Chapter. More information by clicking here.
 
Nuclear weapons: an accident waiting to happen, By Eric Schlosser, in The Guardian, Friday, September 13, 2013

Click here to read a recent (September 16th) interview with Schlosser. Q&A: Author Says DOD Underreported Nuclear-Weapon Accidents, by Rachel Oswald in Global Security Newswire, September 23, 2013

Watch a YouTube video of Schlosser at the New America Foundation.  In the Q&A period he speaks directly to the weakness in the design of the Trident II D-5 missile relating to the warheads encircling the third stage rocket motor containing very high energy "sensitive" propellant.  Skip ahead to approximately the 52 minute mark to catch this reference.

Gadzooks - "Vintage" Nukes on New Tridents!!!

The US Naval Institute has done just what one would expect such an organization to do - raise the alarm over the "vintage" nuclear missiles (Trident II D-5) that will be initially deployed on the Navy's replacement ballistic missile submarines.  The institute's concern is that sooner (and not later) the Navy will need a new missile, and NOW is the time to get to work on it.

The obvious question, which NO ONE seems to be asking, is of what value is the Trident nuclear weapons system (OHIO class submarines with their Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles) in today's world.  The Cold War is long over and the Trident weapons system, which was designed specifically to render the (then) Soviet Union a radioactive wasteland, is a true relic of a bygone era.

Would we really launch massive thermonuclear weapons (Trident II D-5s) against North Korea or Iran, considering the fact that the resulting radioactive fallout would affect adjacent countries.  Have we forgotten that the effects of nuclear weapons, once detonated, are uncontrollable, and that there is no practical way to clean up such a mess???

The final paragraph in the USNI article is laughable and misleading (using the words "current experience:).  In the context of that coupled with the rest of the article one might think that the US nuclear weapons complex was that of a developing nation, and that the technological wizards in North Korea are "currently" whizzing past us.

“The North Koreans have more current experience building and testing nuclear weapons than we do,” Goure said. “They also have more current experience with designing ballistic missiles—from scratch—than we do.”

So long as the US stays fixated on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, we remain locked in a deadly paradox.  So long as the US (and Russia) continue to re-invigorate their nuclear forces, the rest of the world (North Korea, Iran...) will follow.  The results will likely not by pretty.

At any rate, with 143 consecutive successful test flights of the Trident II D-5 missile (under operational conditions) since 1989 (a perfect record!!!), it's hard to think of it as any remotely resembling "vintage."

Note to USNI: THIS is what a "vintage" nuclear weapon looks like.

Read the article for yourself, and see what you think of the author's argument.

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Navy’s Nukes Won’t Keep Pace With New Missile Subs

By Dave Majumdar, USNI [US Naval Institute] News, Tuesday, April 23, 2013,   http://news.usni.org/2013/04/23/navys-nukes-dont-keep-pace-with-new-missile-subs

When the U.S. Navy’s new SSBN (X) conducts its first patrol in 2031 it will be an entirely new vessel, but the boat will initially rely on life-extended 1990s vintage Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to perform its nuclear deterrence mission. The Navy currently expects to keep the D5 in service into the 2040s, after which it may replace the long-serving weapon with a new missile.

Though the United States is upgrading existing missiles and taking steps to keep its existing warheads viable, there is no work being done to develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or SLBM for the time being. The Navy is deferring equipping the new SSBN(X) with a new missile because of the sheer cost of developing and fielding such a system during fiscally lean times. But moreover, there is no immediate military need to do so because the Trident will remain viable for sometime to come. However, the U.S. Strategic Command is conducting an analysis of alternatives for the future.

But there are questions as to how viable the U.S. missile industrial base will be when the time comes to develop a new missile later this century. Russia, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has faced numerous difficulties with developing new ICBMs and SLBMs. The Bulava SLBM, for example, had numerous problems, failing six of 13 launch attempts before 2009. However, after a difficult period of troubleshooting, the Bulava program now appears to be on track, with seven successful missile launches since October 2010.

“Why would we be any different if we don’t maintain the experience base in making these things?” asks Dan Goure, an analyst at the Lexington Institute. NASA, for example, is essentially starting over in developing manned space-flight capability to a certain extent because those skill sets have atrophied, Goure said. “We can hope—only hope—that the work being done for Trident and United Launch Alliance and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and work being done for NASA will maintain enough of a cadre so that we can in fact design a new ICBM,” he said.

There is no question that America needs to invest in keeping its nuclear deterrent credible, said Peter Huessy, an expert on nuclear weapons at GeoStrategic Analysis. In his view, however, the missile industrial base is less of a concern than retaining the ability to develop an actual nuclear warhead, he said. Huessy and Barry Watts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments say that programs like the EELV or refurbishment programs for existing missiles are probably sufficient to keep ICBM and SLBM design skills alive. Huessy said that there are many components on the U.S. Air Force Minuteman III, for example, that are being replaced—which requires many of the skills needed to design an entirely new weapon. “They have all sorts of ideas on how to build a Minuteman [replacement],” he said.

But while the United States continues to upgrade existing missiles, other nations continue to develop and field nuclear weapons and the launch vehicles to deliver them. Russia continues to modernize its arsenal with new Topol-M ICBMs, new Bulava SLBMs, and reportedly another new heavy ICBM that is under development. So too, is China modernizing its nuclear forces, Huessy said. “[Assistant Defense Secretary Madelyn Creeden, in her April 17 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee] also concluded China is building advanced solid fueled rockets, a new type 094 Jin-class submarine along with its new JL-2 missile,” he said.

But the real problem might be far more serious than whether the United States will be able to build a new ballistic missile. There are doubts as to whether the nation will be able to retain the talent to build a new nuclear weapon in the future. “We’re as a matter of policy leaning in the direction of exiting the nuclear business,” Watts said.

Watts said that he simply does not know if the United States still has the capability to develop a new weapon. Huessy said that while lots of lab testing has been done, the country has not built a nuclear weapon since about 1991. “We’re also losing that talent,” he said. “The number of people who have built nuclear weapons could fit in a phone booth.”

The leftover warheads from end of the Cold War were approaching limits of what could be achieved for yield, Watts said, and were only designed for a lifespan of about 10 years. Now the weapons are approaching an average age of about quarter of century.

Though the U.S. nuclear stockpile most likely works, at the end the day, without a full-scale test, it is not known if the weapons would actually detonate properly, Huessy said. Essentially, without testing, the United States is hoping computer models are robust enough to make sure the devices work. The labs look for deteriorated parts and replace those. Ultimately though, “We’re guessing that they work,” Huessy said.

The United States could resolves some of those issues by bringing forward low-level design programs for ballistic missiles, Goure said. For a ballistic-missile program, the military would have to consider whether the Minuteman and Trident could be replaced with a common weapon, he said. However, given the size restrictions on board a submarine, a naval weapon would have to be adapted for land-based use—otherwise, it simply would not work. ICBMs are much larger than the typical SLBM and would not fit into the 87-inch tubes of either the Ohio or SSBN(X) classes of submarines, Goure said.

As for maintaining the nuclear-weapons complex, U.S. policy would have to fundamentally change. Watts said that if the assumption is that nuclear weapons are “going away,” then investing in new designs is a waste. President Barack Obama’s administration adheres to a vision of a “global zero” for nuclear weapons, but has pledged to maintain a credible deterrent. However, as the nation’s ability to design and build such weapons atrophies, so does that deterrent—and as Watts points out, the number nuclear-weapon states is increasing rather than decreasing.

“The North Koreans have more current experience building and testing nuclear weapons than we do,” Goure said. “They also have more current experience with designing ballistic missiles—from scratch—than we do.”

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Trident Missile System Upgrades to Parallel OHIO Class Replacement

Editor's Note: The following article confirms that the Navy will continue upgrading the Trident missile system as it prepares to build the next generation ballistic missile submarine to carry the Trident missiles.  This editor highlighted portions of the article in bold typeface for emphasis.

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Navy: Upgrades Required for Trident Launch System

by BRYANT JORDAN on APRIL 10, 2013,  published in DEFENSETECH

Navy leaders said Wednesday the service must ensure the Pentagon remains committed to upgrades to the Trident missile launch system in line with the development of the replacement for the Ohio-class nuclear submarine fleet.

Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs, said it is necessary to revitalize and qualify the launch systems of the Trident II D-5, which is deployed aboard the U.S. Navy’s 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile subs and Britain’s four Vanguard-class submarines.

“The Trident is the most survivable leg of the Triad, and it also gives the U.S. a second-strike ability,” Benedict said at the annual Sea Air Space Exposition at National Harbor, Md. The missile – currently the Trident II D-5 version – was developed and deployed jointly by both the U.S. and the United Kingdom since the 1990s.

The missile has been going through life-extensions and the two countries plan to continue deploying them as they transition to the next-generation nuclear submarine.

While budget pressures mount with the sequestration cuts to defense funding, service leaders will be forced to balance modernization priorities. Benedict emphasized the importance of maintaining investment in updating the systems associated within the Nuclear triad.

The U.S. Navy plans to replace its 14 Ohio-class subs with a dozen new ballistic missile submarines. The Navy awarded General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division a $1.85 billion contract for the development of the Ohio-Class Replacement Program. The Ohio-class subs start hitting their end-of-life in 2027, and will be retired in the years following.

The Navy anticipates its replacements to come on line by the mid-2020s.

Navy leaders have said they can accept the risk of two fewer nuclear capable submarines because of the speed and stealth capability the service expects to develop into the new Ohio-class. Those same leaders will also depend on improved accuracy of upgraded Tridents.

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Source URL for this article is http://defensetech.org/2013/04/10/navy-says-upgrades-required-for-trident-launch-system/